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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used 
in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is 
informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on 
firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance 
evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO 
stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I 
collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class 
firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms 
relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less 
common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class 
firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock 
compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A large stream of academic work has examined the effect of dual-class structures 
on firm value and performance.1 Some studies find that the separation of ownership and 
control inherent in dual-class structures leads to lower firm value and poor performance 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2009), while there also is evidence suggesting that dual-
class structures enhance firm value (Dimitrov and Jain 2006). Numerous high-profile 
companies have chosen a dual-class stock structure in recent years—underscoring the 
importance of the issue in practice. Institutional investors especially, have been 
concerned about multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights, and complain that 
dual-class stock companies limit their ability to press boards and executives to institute 
real changes (Byrd 2012; see Appendix A).In contrast, dual-class companies argue that 
their structures allow them to more effectively focus on long-term value creation (see 
Appendix B). 
This study revisits this question by looking at the design of executive 
compensation and provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures in dual-
class firms. The choice of performance measures is informative about intentions of the 
board of directors and about the extent to which CEOs are incentivized to focus on firms’ 
long-term versus short-term objectives. In this regard, CEO stock compensation 
                                                          
1 Dual-class firms issue two classes of common stock, designated as inferior stock and superior 
stock, or Class A and Class B shares. The inferior stock has one vote per share while superior 
stock has multiple voting rights.  Although these two classes of shares represent the same 
underlying ownership in the company, the non-publicly traded superior shares have greater voting 
rights per share and thus more control. 
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arrangements provide an ideal setting to examine the purpose of dual-class stock 
structures. 
There are two main theoretical explanations of dual-class structures. On the one 
hand, the managerial power theory holds that dual-class structures misalign economic 
incentives and voting power and thus disadvantage outside shareholders (Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker 2002). On the other hand, optimal contracting theory holds that adoption of a 
dual-class structure allows managers to enhance shareholder value over the long-run 
(Core and Larcker 2003, Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran, and Smith 2011). Specifically, it 
asserts that outside shareholders face information asymmetry about the firm and are 
unable to make informed choices about strategic initiatives. In contrast, company 
founders or other insiders of dual-class firms are able to innovate and exploit long-run 
product cycles for the benefit of shareholders. Firm value suffers if insiders are subjected 
to short-term market pressures. Thus, company founders or other insiders are said to need 
more voting power to better exploit their private information for the benefit of all 
shareholders.  
To the extent that the optimal contracting view holds, I expect performance 
measures in executive contracts of dual-class firms to reflect long performance evaluation 
horizons, which incentivize CEOs to focus on strategic initiatives and shield them from 
short-term market pressures. In contrast, if executives self-servingly influence the design 
of compensation contracts and dual-class structures facilitate managerial entrenchment, I 
expect performance measures to have a short horizon. Short-term performance measures 
are more easily controlled or manipulated by executives and thus should lead to higher 
compensation.   
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I examine several characteristics of performance measures in CEO stock awards 
to empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon. Specifically, I measure the 
length of the performance evaluation period, the use of stock-based measures, and the use 
of peer-based measures. Furthermore, I focus on the choice of performance measures in 
stock awards as opposed to other compensation components for the following reasons. 
First, stock awards account for a considerable share of executives’ total compensation 
and thus are economically significant to both the firm and the CEO. Second, unlike cash 
bonuses or salary, which are backward-looking and short-term oriented, stock awards 
spanning multiple years are forward-looking and potentially long-term oriented. 
I hand collect data on CEO compensation contracts from proxy statements filed 
with the SEC from 2007 to 2011 for all U.S. dual-class firms in the S&P 1500to assess 
whether dual-class firms choose performance measures differently than do single-class 
firms. Due to increased firm disclosure requirements implemented by the SEC in 2006, I 
am able to use this data to examine contractual features of performance measures in 
executives’ equity awards, particularly performance-contingent equity awards. 2 Such 
contract features include the length of the performance evaluation period, whether the 
specific performance metrics employed are stock-based, and the use of absolute or 
relative benchmarks (RPE). My main sample consists of 419 U.S. dual-class firms and a 
matched control group of single-class firms.  
                                                          
2Since 2006, the SEC has required firms to disclose executive compensation in more details in the 
newly created section called “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” (CD&A) in their proxy 
statements.  The SEC’s executive compensation disclosure rules require detailed information on 
how executive compensation is determined. 
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My main findings are as follows. First, I find that market-based metrics are less 
likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms: 37.1% of single-class 
firms in my sample use market-based metrics, while only 8.8% of dual-class firms use 
them. Second, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than 
single-class firms. In particular, I find that only 6.9% of dual-class firms use peer-based 
metrics as compared to 26.4% of single-class firms. My findings suggest that adoption of 
a dual-class structure is consistent with shielding CEOs from short-term market pressures 
with regard to their long-term strategic business decision making. Avoiding the use of 
stock-based measures reduces the pressure on CEOs to meet quarterly earnings targets 
and to manage analysts’ quarterly forecasts. Similarly, avoiding the use of peer-based 
metrics alleviates the pressure to compete with peers that may be overly focused on 
pursuing short-term stock returns.  
My results contribute to prior literature in three ways. First, while prior 
compensation studies have focused on the consequences of compensation contract 
choices, such as the comparison of total compensation amount in dual-class firms with 
the total compensation amount in single-class firms, far less work has been done to study 
the determinants of compensation contracts. My study fills in this void and highlights that 
the choice of single- versus dual-class structures is an important driver of compensation 
design. 
Second, prior literature seldom controls for CEO stock ownership even though it 
is an important determinant of other compensation choices and varies considerably 
between dual-class and single-class firms. In theory, executives with greater equity stakes 
have greater incentives to build economic value, as actions impairing firm value would 
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do damage to the executive's personal wealth (Larker and Tayan 2011). Therefore, this 
study matches dual-class firms to a control group of single-class firms that are similar in 
terms of CEO stock ownership. 
Finally, my findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from 
short-term market pressures and design compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile 
stock prices. Although these findings do not necessarily favor the optimal contracting 
view over the managerial entrenchment view (or vice versa), they nevertheless inform the 
debate about the purpose of dual-class firms.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops relevant 
hypotheses and places my paper in the context of related research. Section 3 describes 
how the sample data is generated and compares dual-class and non-dual-class firms on 
certain dimensions of stock awards. Section 4 reports the analysis and results and 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks on my findings.    
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Literature Review  
Multiple prior studies have investigated the effects of dual-class ownership 
structures on the quality of disclosures, the informativeness of earnings and dividend 
policy, business investment decisions, and executive compensation. Overall, prior 
research does not provide consistent evidence that dual-class structures either benefit or 
harm ordinary shareholders.  
One stream of literature asserts that dual-class firms are more prone to pursue 
private benefits at shareholders’ expense. Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2005) compare 
the informativeness of earnings for firms with dual-class and single-class equity 
structures, and the findings show that earnings are generally less informative for dual-
class firms. Dual-class structures are deemed to reduce the credibility of earnings. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2009) find that during the period from 1994 to 2002, dual-
class firms perform worse than comparable firms for which all shares confer equal voting 
rights. They also report that dual-class firms’ value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow 
rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) 
argue that dual-class equity can create agency costs an order of magnitude larger than the 
costs associated with a controlling shareholder who also has a majority of the cash flow 
rights in the corporation.  
Another stream of literature finds that a dual-class equity structure has economic 
benefits. Dimitrov and Jain (2006) show that recapitalization of one class of common 
stocks into restricted voting stocks is a value enhancing initiative for the general 
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shareholders. Claessens et al. (2000) find that the negative association between issuance 
of dual-class shares and corporate valuation reported in prior studies is not statistically 
significant, and do not find evidence that the issuance of dual-class shares separating 
ownership and control is associated with the valuation discount.   
Closely related to my work are several studies that examine dual-class stock 
structure from the standpoint of executive compensation. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2009) 
find that divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights increases managerial 
extraction of private benefits of control. Specifically, they find that when the divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights widens at dual-class companies, (a) CEOs 
receive higher compensation and (b) capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder 
value. Further, they report that the bigger the divergence, the greater the rent extraction. 
Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) show that family members in executive 
positions in dual-class companies are paid significantly more than executive family 
members in single-class companies with concentrated control.  
Still, from the perspective of executive compensation, some studies confirm the 
merits and rationality of dual-class structures. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), 
Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002), and Core and Larker (2002) test whether 
executives are given incentive-based compensation to align their interests with those of 
outside shareholders, which would be consistent with optimal contract theory. They find 
that executives receive higher compensation in dual-class firms than in single-class firms, 
and this higher compensation is to prevent dual-class executives from taking advantage of 
their higher voting leverage.   
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However, many extant studies comparing dual-class and single-class firms lack 
controls for CEO stock ownership, which is likely a confounding factor affecting their 
results. Thus, in this study, I control for CEO stock ownership to conduct a more rigorous 
test. Details are discussed in Section 3. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development   
   I examine the effect of dual-class structure on three design features of CEOs’ 
performance-vested stock awards: the length of the performance evaluation period, the 
use of market-based performance measures, and the use of relative performance 
measures.   
  First, an important feature of long-term incentive awards is the length of the 
period over which performance is measured. A short performance period may promote 
short-term myopic and opportunistic behavior or even encourage managers to manipulate 
their performance measures (Mizik 2010; Dallas 2012). If the goal of dual-class 
structures is to promote long-term focus, then the use of short-term performance 
measures is difficult to justify. Conversely, a long performance period that eliminates 
unwanted short-term market fluctuations and better coincides with long-term strategic 
business decisions seems congruent with the contracting justification of dual-class 
structures. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H1: Compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms evaluate CEO performance 
over longer periods when awarding performance-vested stock grants.  
Second, the board's choice of performance measures should reflect company 
strategy and what type of actions are expected from management (Ittner, Larcker and 
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Rajan, 1997). The Informativeness Principle indicates that a measure is useful for 
contracting as long as it is incrementally informative about managerial efforts 
(Holmstrom, 1979).Both accounting measures and stock returns measures are reflective 
of managerial performance and commonly used in CEO performance evaluation. Prior 
research examines the use of accounting versus stock returns measures for purposes of 
awarding CEOs’ cash bonuses (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Baker 1987; Core et al. 
2003). The evidence generally suggests that cash bonus plans put more weight on market 
measures than on accounting measures when accounting measures are noisier, which is 
consistent with prediction of contract theory (Banker and Datar, 1989). 
If CEOs are evaluated using stock market-based performance measures, then they 
would be incentivized to pursue short-term market returns rather than to focus on long-
term strategic goals. Thus, greater reliance on market-based performance measures 
among dual-class firms would contradict the purpose of protecting CEOs’ long-term 
strategic decision making from market pressures. As a result, I hypothesize that if dual-
class firms have a long-term orientation, then they will be less likely to use market-based 
measures to benchmark their CEOs’ performance. 
H2: Compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms are less likely to use stock-
based measures when awarding performance-vested stock grants. 
Finally, relative performance evaluation (RPE) can be incorporated in performance-
vested stock awards to benchmark the firm’s stock return performance or accounting 
performance against a group of peer firms (Holmstrom, 1982; Albuquerque, 2009; Gong 
et al. 2011).Use of RPE might filter out exogenous noise (common shocks) that is 
unrelated to actions undertaken by the firm, thus enhancing the link between performance 
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measurement and the efforts and actions of the CEOs. However, RPE measures may be 
problematic in dual-class firms. 
If a dual-class structure is established to protect managers from short-term market 
interference with respect to their unique long-term innovative or strategic business 
decisions, then it could be challenging for the board to identify an appropriate 
comparison group against which to benchmark managers’ performance. Even if an 
appropriate peer group could be identified for a dual-class firm, the dual-class firm could 
wind up implicitly incorporating short-term oriented measures in its own evaluation 
process if firms in the peer group use short-term oriented performance measures for their 
executives. Hence, I hypothesize that:   
   H3: Compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms are less likely to use peer-
based targets than single-class firms when awarding performance-vested stock grants.     
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Chapter 3 
SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLES, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. Sample Selection for the Dual-Class and Single-Class Samples 
In this study, the dual-class firm sample covers all the U.S. dual-class firms in the 
S&P 1500 from 2007 to 2011. In order to obtain a comprehensive set of dual-class firms, 
I first construct a list of possible candidates from Compustat. From this candidate sample, 
I examine annual filings made with the Securities and Exchange Commission to confirm 
that the company actually has a dual-class stock structure. The final dual-class sample 
consists of 419 firms.  
I proceed in two steps to match the dual-class sample with a control group of 
single-class firms. In the first step, I rely on coarsened exact matching (CEM), which 
ensures that the treatment and control samples have identical characteristics. This 
procedure maximizes the quality of matching at the cost of a reduced sample size because 
control firms with identical characteristics as treatment firms are not always available. A 
necessary step to ensure an exact match is to convert every continuous variable to a set of 
different intervals, with each interval represented by an indicator variable (Iacus, King, 
and Porro 2008). In my sample, CEM yields 339control firms with a single-class 
structure. 
In the second step, I rely on propensity score matching (PSM) to find control 
observations for the remaining 80 dual-class firms (Guo and Fraser 2010). PSM still 
assures that the control sample has similar characteristics as the treatment sample. The 
main benefit of PSM is that it uses all available control variables and does not require 
continuous variables to be represented by indicator variables. The propensity score is the 
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predicted value from a Logit model of the likelihood of receiving treatment as a function 
of the control variables, and it can be used as a measure of the similarity between the 
treatment firm and control firm.  
 
3.2. Variables 
 In general, CEO compensation arrangements are comprised of multiple 
components, including base salary, cash bonuses, restricted stock grants, and restricted 
stock option grants. For grants of restricted stock, different vesting schemes are used: 
performance vesting and time vesting. For a traditional time-vesting stock award, a stock 
will simply vest upon the completion of a time-based service requirement (e.g., 3 year 
service-based vesting). Time-based vesting does not take performance into account; stock 
vests with the passage of time. On the other hand, vesting of performance-based stock 
awards occurs upon attainment of pre-established absolute or relative targets. Vesting 
requirements use measures of company performance. If CEO does not meet the 
requirements the company set forth for the performance evaluation period, the stock 
shares are typically forfeited to the company. Only performance-vesting stock awards 
explicitly incorporate performance measures for evaluation purposes.   
I hand collect proxy statement data on the choice of performance measures used 
in CEO stock compensation. Vesting of stock grants to executives is triggered by 
performance-vesting provisions. The criteria for number of restricted stock units vested 
are contingent on one or more performance metrics. Therefore, the CEO stock 
compensation is the performance–vesting award. I classify performance metrics into the 
following seven broad categories following Gao, Hwang and Wu (2012): (i) stock 
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returns; (ii) earnings and other bottom-line measures such as EPS, EPS growth, operating 
income, net income, and operating margin;(iii) accounting return measures such as return 
on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA); (iv) sales and sales growth; (v) cash flow; 
(vi) other financial measures, such as market share; and (vii) non-financial measures, 
such as customer satisfaction. Performance on any of these metrics can be evaluated 
against absolute targets or relative to the performance of a group of peers. 
 To test my hypotheses, I construct three main variables: STOCK is an indicator 
variable for the use of stock returns as one of the performance measures. PEERS is an 
indicator variable for relative performance evaluation on at least one of the performance 
measures. LENGTH describes how many years of a CEO's performance is assessed in 
terms of the designated metrics when awarding stock compensation. 
 I also use several control variables. OWN refers to CEO equity ownership, and 
measures the percentage of firm equity owned by the CEO. It is calculated as the number 
of shares owned by the CEO (with options excluded) divided by the number of common 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.CEO ownership is an important variable to 
control for in the matching process because it affects other compensation choices and at 
the same time is relatively high in dual-class firms.  
 SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. LEVERAGE is the debt-to-
equity ratio. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market capitalization four 
months after fiscal year end divided by common equity. SALEGROW captures the firm’s 
annual sales growth rate. For both the CEM and PSM matched samples, I also control for 
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the 10 Fama-French 48 industries that differentiate the most between dual-class and 
single-class firms.3 
 Finally, I also include the following variables in descriptive statistics 
comparisons. MV is market value, calculated as the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price at fiscal year end. CAPXS is equal to capital 
expenditures scaled by sales. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics concerning characteristics of dual- and 
single-class firms. The matched single-class firms are similar to the dual-class firms at 
the median value in terms of size, leverage, ROE, market-to-book, and CEO equity 
ownership percentage, implying that my matching process has generated a control sample 
effectively. Dual-class firms tend to have lower sales growth, lower market value, less 
leverage, and lower profitability (ROE) compared to S&P 1500 firms, but are similar in 
terms of size. However, dual-class firms have higher capital expenditures than S&P 1500 
firms. 
Table 2 shows the adoption of performance-vesting and time-vesting stock awards 
among dual-class and single-class firms. Performance-based stock awards are relatively 
                                                          
3These industries are Communication, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Food Products, Printing and 
Publishing, Apparel, Pharmaceutical Products, Consumer Goods, Electrical Equipment, 
Machinery, and Entertainment. During the CEM matching, I transform Size, Leverage and Own 
into three indicator variables, respectively, and ROE and MTB into two indicator variables, 
respectively. Ten industries are also controlled as indicator variables. The number of indicator 
variables for every continuous variable is determined by maximizing the explanatory power of 
the Logistic model of treatment. 
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more frequently adopted in single-class firms. In addition, time-vesting stock awards are 
commonly used in both dual-class and single-class firms.  
Figures 1 and 2 show that the distribution of CEO stock ownership in dual-class 
and single-class firms is similar. This is because my sample matching procedures selected 
single-class firms with the same or closest CEO ownership percentage as in the dual-class 
firms. In contrast, Figures 3 and 4 suggest the distribution of CEO stock ownership is 
different in the broader sample of S&P 1500 firm. In particular, CEOs in S&P 1500 firms 
are much less likely to have equity stakes exceeding 5% of firm stock.  
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Chapter 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
4.1. Matching Analysis 
This section uses matching estimators to provide an analysis of how a dual-class 
structure affects the design of performance measures in performance-based stock awards. 
Matching estimators are increasingly used in executive compensation and performance 
measure research (Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker 2010; Casas-Arce, Indjejikian and 
Matějka 2013). As discussed earlier, I match dual-class firms to a control sample of 
single-class firms in the S&P 1500 firms with similar characteristics. The CEM and PSM 
designs control for all main characteristics of the firms except the horizon measures 
under investigation. Thus, employing these two matching procedures ensures identical or 
similar characteristics between the control sample and treatment sample. Since influential 
control variables are all included in the matching process, the in-sample homogeneity 
enables a direct contrast between dual-class and single-class firms in terms of matching 
estimators. 
H1 predicts that dual-class firms use a longer performance evaluation period for 
CEOs’ performance-vesting stock grants. I compare the length of the performance 
evaluation periods used by dual-class and single-class firms and find that, on average, 
dual-class firms evaluate CEO performance over a 2.35 year span, while single-class 
firms assess CEO performance over a 2.44 year span when awarding performance-vested 
stock compensation—a statistically insignificant difference (p-value = 0.757). Therefore, 
the results of this test do not provide evidence that distinguishes between optimal 
contracting and managerial entrenchment. 
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H2 predicts that compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms are less likely to 
use market-based measures when awarding performance-vesting stock grants.I find that 
only 8.8% of dual-class firms use market-based metrics, while 37.1% of single-class 
firms use them, indicating that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-
class firms relative to single-class firms. The difference in the adoption of market-based 
metrics between single-class and dual-class firms is statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
This result suggests that, consistent with H2, dual-class firms shield their CEOs from 
short-term market fluctuations and enable them to pay more attention to long-term 
strategic development.   
Finally, I compare the use of peer-based measures across dual-class and single-
class firms. H3 predicts that dual-class firms are less likely to adopt peer-based measures 
in performance-vested stock awards. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that 6.9% of 
dual-class firms use peer-based metrics as compared to 26.4% of single-class firms. This 
result is consistent with the board adopting absolute measures to avoid the use of 
inappropriate peer companies as benchmarks.      
  
4.2. Regression Models 
In this section, I use an alternative research design to test my hypotheses. 
Matching methodology finds matched firms based on the characteristics of the variables 
matched. As supposed to PSM and CEM, logistic regression is able to control as many 
variables of interest as needed. 
Specifically, I estimate separate regression models of performance measure 
choice as a function of dual-class structure using the following framework:  
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where the dependent variable is equal to a) the length of the performance period, as 
measured in years (LENGTH); b) whether the firm uses market-based metrics (STOCK); 
or c) whether the firm uses peer-based metrics (PEERS).As LENGTH is a continuous 
variable measured in years, the LENGTH model is estimated via ordinary least squares 
regression. The STOCK and PEERS models are estimated via logistic regression, as these 
variables are dichotomous. 
The independent variables are as follows. DUAL is an indicator variable 
measuring if the firm has a dual class structure. I control for the factors shown in prior 
literature to be the most influential factors in adopting a dual-class stock structure, 
including firm size (SIZE), accounting ROE, the debt-to-equity ratio (LEVERAGE), and 
the market-to-book ratio (MTB). OWN is defined as percentage of total shares owned by 
the CEO with options excluded. The percentage gap in industry density between dual 
class and single class firms is very pronounced in ten industries, so these industries are 
controlled for in the regression. I also include year fixed effects. STOCKP is defined as 
the percentage of CEO stock compensation among the total compensation.  
There might be an endogeneity issue in terms of OWN and STOCKP variables. 
Since these two variables are potentially predetermined simultaneously with dependent 
variables, they might be related to the error term. To address this possible endogeneity 
issue for variables OWN and STOCKP, I estimate two additional regressions for each 
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model that omit OWN or STOCKP. If the regressions show consistent results, then it 
means endogeneity is not a problem.   
Hypothesis 1 predicts that dual-class firms build a longer performance assessment 
period into their CEOs’ performance-vesting stock grants than single-class firms do. 
Table 4 reports the empirical results of the LENGTH regressions, which test H1. The 
coefficient of DUAL in the full regression is statistically insignificant, and the additional 
regressions omitting OWN and STOCKP show results consistent with those of the full 
regression. Overall, I find no significant differences in performance period length 
between dual and non-dual class firms. Thus, I find no evidence in support of either 
optimal contracting or managerial entrenchment since the length of the performance 
evaluation period appears to be unrelated to dual-class structure.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that dual-class firms are less inclined to use market-based 
performance measures for performance-vesting stock grants. Table 5 reports the 
empirical results estimating the effect of a dual class stock structure on the choice to use 
stock-market-based performance measures. Consistent with H2, DUAL’s coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, and the supplemental regressions omitting OWN 
and STOCKP yield similar results. These findings indicate that dual class firms are less 
likely to evaluate the CEO’s performance based on stock-market targets for purposes of 
performance-contingent stock compensation. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts that dual-class firms are less likely to use RPE to 
evaluate and benchmark CEOs’ performance. Hence, I anticipate the effect of the dual-
class variable (DUAL) in the PEER regression to be negative. As shown in Table 6, the 
significantly negative coefficient for DUAL indicates that dual-class firms are more 
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inclined to use absolute performance measures than comparable single-class firms. This 
finding is consistent with the optimal contracting explanation of Hypothesis 3.In other 
words, identifying an appropriate set of peers for benchmark purposes maybe difficult for 
firm that has a unique and innovative business model. Hence, on average, dual-class 
firms are less likely to use RPE for long-term stock awards. This finding is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that when a firm adopts dual class stock structure, the 
likelihood for using absolute performance measures increases. Dual class firms are more 
inclined to protect CEOs’ incentives to innovate, and therefore provide forms of 
compensation that shield their CEOs’ long-term business decisions from market 
pressures. In this sense, dual-class firms' claims of long-term orientation appear justified. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
The rationale for dual-class stock structures continues to be debated in the 
academic literature. This study revisits dual-class share structures to investigate whether 
such firms incentivize their CEOs using performance-based awards that incorporate long-
horizon metrics. This paper is among the first to examine differences in performance 
measure usage between dual-class and single-class firms. Specifically, I examine the 
measures used for performance-contingent stock compensation for CEOs within dual-
class firms and find evidence that a dual-class structure is associated with a lower 
probability of using stock market based performance measures and peer-based metrics 
relative to a single-class structure. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the 
notion that CEOs in dual-class firms are shielded from short-term market pressures and 
provides some evidence in support of the optimal contracting perspective. However, I 
also find that the length of the performance evaluation period does not differ between 
dual-class and single-class firms. This result suggests that dual-class firms do not use 
shorter evaluation periods to ease their CEOs’ achievement of performance targets. 
 Caution is necessary in explaining these findings. I focus on one component of 
CEO compensation—performance-contingent equity awards—because it is well suited to 
examining whether CEOs of dual-class firms are incentivized to belong-term or short-
term oriented. With the decline of stock option awards, multi-year bonus plans could be 
another channel for examining the performance evaluation horizon of dual-class firms. 
Furthermore, most performance evaluation periods in my sample are either one year or 
three years in length. The length of the performance evaluation period may be subject to 
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the influence of compensation consultants who might offer the same suggestions to 
different companies, resulting in similar performance evaluation periods across firms. 
Future research could extend the sample size to further explore this issue. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXCEPT FROM COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (CII)'S                                                    
CORRESPONDENCE 
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CII follow-up letter to NYSE meeting on dual-class stock, by Ann Yerger, Dec. 10, 2012 
 
 "CII’s primary concerns about the multi-class structures centers on the profound 
governance challenges created by these structures. Simply put: directors may be less 
empowered to actively oversee management and make course corrections when they can 
be elected or fired by founders and/or their descendants. " 
 
 
      ------ Ann Yerger 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXCERPT FROM YAHOO NEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Google to split stock to keep power with founders, by Barbara Ortuyay, April 12, 2012 
 
 
      Google’s founders argue that Google will be more successful if the company 
concentrates on its long-term vision.  
      Without change [issuing a new class of stock with no voting power], senior leaders 
would eventually lose their voting power. CEO Larry Page and fellow co-founder Sergey 
Brin said that would undermine “our aspiration for Google over the very long term.”  
      “It’s important to bear in mind that this proposal will only have an effect on 
governance over the very long term,” Page and Brin wrote their letter to investors. ” It’s 
just that since we know what we want to do, there’s no reason to delay the decision.” 
 
------  Larry Page and Sergey Brin 
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics for Dual-Class Firms, Single-Class Firms and S&P 1500 Firms 
  dual N mean s.d. p25 p50 p75 
  
 
     SIZE 1 419 7.857 1.624 6.719 7.541 8.700 
 
0 419 8.014 1.796 6.674 7.814 9.027 
 
1500 7500 7.987 1.669 6.763 7.856 9.010 
LEVERAGE 1 419 0.168 0.177 0.016 0.126 0.260 
 
0 419 0.183 0.192 0.012 0.153 0.267 
 
1500 7500 0.184 0.170 0.027 0.155 0.291 
ROE 1 419 -0.015 0.844 0.023 0.086 0.151 
 
0 419 0.030 1.470 0.028 0.096 0.191 
 
1500 7500 0.091 2.569 0.047 0.109 0.177 
MTB 1 419 1.752 9.815 1.083 1.641 2.825 
 
0 419 2.813 4.942 1.192 1.873 3.112 
 
1500 7500 2.555 19.518 1.252 1.892 3.011 
SALEGROW 1 419 5.215 18.129 -2.652 4.590 13.002 
 
0 419 9.718 59.859 -4.068 5.235 13.943 
 
1500 7500 7.353 28.509 -3.129 5.963 14.889 
MV 1 419 9374 26740 642 1574 4836 
 
0 419 10733 29529 733 1955 7598 
 
1500 7500 10025 28954 725 1874 7026 
OWN 1 419 5.612 11.206 0.097 0.659 4.785 
 
0 419 4.036 8.786 0.115 0.384 1.974 
 
1500 7500 1.790 5.064 0.108 0.323 1.013 
CAPXS 1 419 0.045 0.048 0.016 0.032 0.053 
 
0 419 0.052 0.089 0.017 0.029 0.049 
 
1500 7500 0.049 0.078 0.014 0.025 0.039 
 
SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. ROE is annual return on equity for the 
sample company. LEVERAGE is the debt-to-equity ratio. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, 
calculated as the market capitalization four months after fiscal year end divided by common 
equity. SALEGROW captures the firm’s annual sales growth rate. MV is market value, calculated 
as the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price at fiscal year end. 
OWN refers to CEO equity ownership, and measures the percentage of firm equity owned by the 
CEO. It is calculated as the number of shares owned by the CEO (with options excluded) divided 
by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. CAPXS is equal to 
capital expenditures scaled by sales. 
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Table 2: 
CEO Compensation Contract Comparison for Dual-Class and Single-Class Firms 
 
  dual N mean s.d. p25 p50 p75 
  
 
     PERFORMANCE 1 419 0.384 0.487 0 0 1 
 
0 419 0.539 0.499 0 1 1 
TIME-VESTING 1 419 0.403 0.491 0 0 1 
 
0 419 0.482 0.500 0 0 1 
SALARY 1 419 935.103 791.801 609.808 870 1000 
  0 419 848.452 486.808 550 741.756 1000 
BONUS 1 419 291.455 1228.438 0 0 0 
 
0 419 446.258 2560.984 0 0 0 
STOCK 1 419 2114.843 7193.6 0 648.543 1844.25 
 
0 419 2141.778 3239.162 46.552 1038.96 2624.573 
STOCKP 1 419 0.239 0.293 0 0.195 0.360 
 
0 419 0.329 0.412 0.032 0.270 0.468 
DUALITY 1 419 0.505 0.501 0 1 1 
 
0 419 0.611 0.488 0 1 1 
INDDIR 1 419 6.345 2.761 5 6 8 
 
0 419 7.271 2.302 6 7 9 
 
PERFORMANCEdescribes whether or not the sample firm adopts performance-vesting 
stock awards for its CEO compensation. Vesting of performance-based stock awards occurs upon 
attainment of pre-established absolute or relative targets of firm performance. TIME-VESTING 
describes whether or not the sample firm uses time-vesting stock awards for its CEO 
compensation. Time-vesting stock awards vest with the passage of time. SALARY is the CEO’s 
base salary compensation. BONUSis the CEO’s bonus compensation disclosed in the proxy 
statement. STOCKis the CEO’s stock compensation. STOCKP is defined as the percentage of 
CEO stock compensation among the total compensation. DUALITYdescribes the dual role of 
CEO, and it is equal to 1 if CEO also holds the role of chairman of the board, and 0 
otherwise.INDDIR describes board independence, and it is the number of independent directors. 
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Table 3: 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis on Performance Measure Choices 
 
 Panel A: Performance Evaluation Period Length 
LENGTH 
    
 
 
Obs Mean Difference T-stat P-value 
Treated 161 2.352 -0.088 -0.63 0.757 
Controls 159 2.440 
  
 
     
 
Panel B: Stock Market-based Performance Measures 
STOCK 
    
 
 
Obs Mean Difference T-stat P-value 
Treated 161 0.088 -0.283 -6.35 0.000 
Controls 159 0.371 
  
 
  
    
 
Panel C: Peers-based Performance Measures  
PEERS 
    
 
 
Obs Mean Difference T-stat P-value 
Treated 161 0.069 -0.195 -4.82 0.000 
Controls 159 0.264 
  
 
 
LENGTH describes how many years of a CEO's performance is assessed in terms of the 
designated metrics when awarding stock compensation. 
STOCK is an indicator variable for the use of stock returns as one of the performance measures.  
PEERS is an indicator variable for relative performance evaluation on at least one of the 
performance measures. 
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Table 4: 
 
Regression Analysis on the Length of Performance Evaluation Period 
 
 
 
  Coef. z p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. z p-value 
DUAL 0.006 0.040 0.965 0.012 0.090 0.926 0.015 0.120 0.908 
SIZE 0.088 2.250 0.025 0.088 2.230 0.027 0.077 1.990 0.048 
LEVARAGE -0.248 -0.690 0.490 -0.285 -0.800 0.423 -0.301 -0.840 0.401 
ROE 0.269 1.910 0.057 0.267 1.900 0.059 0.273 1.930 0.054 
MTB -0.017 -1.440 0.150 -0.017 -1.450 0.149 -0.017 -1.460 0.144 
EBITVOL 0.022 0.990 0.324 0.022 1.000 0.317 0.020 0.880 0.379 
SALEGROW -0.003 -1.790 0.074 -0.003 -1.790 0.075 -0.002 -1.720 0.087 
OWN 0.014 1.700 0.090 0.015 1.820 0.069    
STOCKP -0.143 -0.830 0.404    -0.180 -1.060 0.292 
CONS 1.734 5.060 0.000 1.685 4.990 0.000 1.899 5.760 0.000 
Industry  
controls Yes   Yes   Yes 
  
Prob > F 0.026   0.021   0.041 
  
Sample size 387   387   387 
  
Adjusted R2 3.04% 
  
3.12%   2.55%   
 
 
The dependent variable, LENGTH, describes how many years of a CEO's performance is 
assessed in terms of the designated metrics when awarding stock compensation.DUAL is an 
indicator variable measuring if the firm has a dual class structure. SIZE is defined as the natural 
log of total assets. ROE is annual return on equity for the sample company. LEVERAGE is the 
debt-to-equity ratio. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market capitalization four 
months after fiscal year end divided by common equity. EBITVOL is earnings volatility, and 
measured as the standard deviation of annual earnings over prior five years. SALEGROW captures 
the firm’s annual sales growth rate. MV is market value, calculated as the number of common 
shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price at fiscal year end. OWN refers to CEO equity 
ownership, and measures the percentage of firm equity owned by the CEO. It is calculated as the 
number of shares owned by the CEO (with options excluded) divided by the number of common 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STOCKP is defined as the percentage of CEO 
stock compensation among the total compensation. 
  
34 
 
Table 5:  
 
Logistic Model on the Use of Market-Based Performance Measures 
 
 
 
  Coef. z p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. z p-value 
DUAL -1.928 -5.560 0.000 -1.938 -5.610 0.000 -1.948 -5.610 0.000 
SIZE 0.222 2.620 0.009 0.223 2.660 0.008 0.259 3.090 0.002 
LEVARAGE 0.783 1.010 0.311 0.888 1.160 0.247 0.866 1.140 0.254 
ROE 0.800 1.320 0.188 0.763 1.260 0.206 0.746 1.230 0.220 
MTB 0.008 0.170 0.862 0.012 0.260 0.794 0.011 0.240 0.809 
EBITVOL 0.062 1.510 0.131 0.060 1.470 0.142 0.067 1.630 0.104 
SALEGROW -0.004 -1.340 0.180 -0.004 -1.360 0.174 -0.004 -1.410 0.157 
OWN -0.095 -2.090 0.037 -0.098 -2.190 0.028    
STOCKP 0.484 1.480 0.139    0.569 1.730 0.084 
CONS -2.804 -3.650 0.000 -2.616 -3.490 0.000 -3.362 -4.520 0.000 
Industry 
 controls 
Yes 
  
Yes   Yes 
  
Log likelihood   -165.920 
  
-166.990 -169.547 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
  
0.000   0.000   
Sample size 387 
  
387   387   
Pseudo R2 21.39% 
  
20.89%   19.68%   
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable, STOCK, is an indicator variable for the use of stock returns as 
one of the performance measures.DUAL is an indicator variable measuring if the firm has a dual 
class structure. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. ROE is annual return on equity 
for the sample company. LEVERAGE is the debt-to-equity ratio. MTB is the market-to-book 
ratio, calculated as the market capitalization four months after fiscal year end divided by common 
equity. EBITVOL is earnings volatility, and measured as the standard deviation of annual earnings 
over prior five years. SALEGROW captures the firm’s annual sales growth rate. MV is market 
value, calculated as the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price at 
fiscal year end. OWN refers to CEO equity ownership, and measures the percentage of firm 
equity owned by the CEO. It is calculated as the number of shares owned by the CEO (with 
options excluded) divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal 
year. STOCKP is defined as the percentage of CEO stock compensation among the total 
compensation. 
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Table 6: 
 
Logistic Model on the Use of Peer-Based Performance Measures 
 
 
  Coef. Z p-value Coef. Z p-value Coef. Z p-value 
DUAL -1.476 -3.980 0.000 -1.483 -4.010 0.000 -1.487 -4.010 0.000 
SIZE 0.244 2.570 0.010 0.248 2.620 0.009 0.276 2.950 0.003 
LEVARAGE 0.968 1.110 0.266 1.049 1.230 0.220 1.074 1.260 0.209 
ROE 0.719 1.030 0.304 0.694 1.000 0.318 0.670 0.950 0.342 
MTB 0.019 0.350 0.724 0.022 0.400 0.690 0.022 0.400 0.689 
EBITVOL -0.345 -1.230 0.219 -0.331 -1.180 0.239 -0.335 -1.190 0.233 
SALEGROW 0.008 1.260 0.209 0.008 1.330 0.184 0.008 1.260 0.209 
OWN -0.069 -1.520 0.129 -0.072 -1.580 0.114    
STOCKP 0.271 0.670 0.502    0.354 0.920 0.356 
CONS -3.378 -3.770 0.000 -3.312 -3.730 0.000 -3.858 -4.460 0.000 
Industry 
controls 
Yes 
  
Yes   Yes 
  
Log likelihood   -145.326 -145.536 -147.102 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
  
0.000   0.000   
Sample size 387 
  
387   387   
Pseudo R2 15.92% 
  
15.79%   14.89%   
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable,PEERS, is an indicator variable for relative performance 
evaluation on at least one of the performance measures.DUAL is an indicator variable measuring 
if the firm has a dual class structure. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. ROE is 
annual return on equity for the sample company. LEVERAGE is the debt-to-equity ratio. MTB is 
the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market capitalization four months after fiscal year end 
divided by common equity. EBITVOL is earnings volatility, and measured as the standard 
deviation of annual earnings over prior five years. SALEGROW captures the firm’s annual sales 
growth rate. MV is market value, calculated as the number of common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price at fiscal year end. OWN refers to CEO equity ownership, and 
measures the percentage of firm equity owned by the CEO. It is calculated as the number of 
shares owned by the CEO (with options excluded) divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STOCKP is defined as the percentage of CEO stock 
compensation among the total compensation. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of CEO Stock Ownership for Dual-Class Firms 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of CEO Stock Ownership for Single-Class Firms 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of CEO Stock Ownership for S&P 1500 Firms 
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Figure 4:  
Another presentation of distribution for dual-class, single-class firms and S&P 1500 firms 
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